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Abstract
*
This paper uncovers some of the implicit assumptions of polity-formation
underpinning the debate about the European Union’s democratic legitimacy. It
uses theories of nationalism to understand why a demos is unlikely to develop
easily at the European level. Based on a two-by-two categorization of the logic
and scope of identity-formation, I conclude that the most promising approach to
European demos-formation conceives of identities as both constructed and
“sticky”. Labeling this theoretical position “bounded integration,” I suggest that
it provides a more realistic foundation for developing democracy-enhancing
reform proposals than does post-nationalist theorizing, especially due to the
former’s explicit attention to identity-conferring mechanisms such as education,
language, and media.RSC 2000/34 © 2000 Lars-Erik CedermanRSC 2000/34 © 2000 Lars-Erik Cederman
“We have made Europe, now we have to make Europeans.” In its paraphrased,
Europeanized form, Massimo d’Azeglio’s famous quip illustrates vividly how
much views of polity-formation have changed compared to the time of Italian
unification. While some of today’s analysts worry about the European Union’s
“democratic deficit,” most reform proposals are limited to voting procedures and
other technical aspects. Some even assert that parliamentary democracy, one of
the great achievements of the last two centuries and supposedly the victor after
the end of the fall of communism, is obsolete anyway. Indeed, very few
proponents of European integration have considered the possibility of launching
an identity-constructing project aiming at the “production” of Europeans.
This paper uncovers some of the implicit assumptions of polity-formation
that underpin the debate about the European Union’s democratic legitimacy.
1 It
does so by using theories of nationalism as a conceptual guide. Without
understanding the mechanisms that prevent a European “demos” from
materializing, it is hard to gauge the chances of transcending the nation-state as
the prime locus of political identification. Based on a survey of such theories, I
conclude that the most persuasive of them adopt a perspective of “bounded
integration.” Such a view tries to problematize the European demos rather than
accepting or denying its existence from the outset.
Thus agreeing with those who express skepticism about a swift trend
toward post-national democracy, I join the “Euro-pessimistic” analysts in
recommending that the authority transfer to Brussels be decelerated in the short
run. Nevertheless, this does not mean that their autonomy-protecting measures
cannot, and should not, be complemented with identity-altering measures in the
long run. The nationalism literature turns the attention to mass-based
instruments of identity-formation. More than anything else, public education
serves a central function not just as a knowledge producer but also as a creator
of citizens. Language policy, both as a part of the school system and in other
contexts, also plays an important role in this connection. Beyond that, the
institutions of civil society, including mass media, political parties, and non-
governmental organizations, support the critical infra-structure without which
democracy would be impossible. Thus, rather than being a mere electoral matter,
democratic governance presupposes an institutional context characterized by
intense communication and social cohesion.
A nationalism-theoretic perspective usefully deflects the attention from
long-standing debates in integration theory that have outlived their usefulness.
Preoccupied with the question of whether there has been, or will be, more or less
institutional integration, intergovernmentalists and neofunctionalists fail to
address the demos question head on. Likewise, political theorists and
comparativists have conducted the debate about the Union’s “democraticRSC 2000/34 © 2000 Lars-Erik Cederman 4
deficit” against the backdrop of a tacit assumption of a European people. More
recently, however, theorists have begun to explore European identity-formation
explicitly. Most prominently, Jürgen Habermas and his followers have applied
his normative theory of “communicative action” to the European Union’s
legitimacy dilemma. Framed as a post-nationalist vision, the project of
“constitutional patriotism” serves to “rescue” democracy from the nation-state
(Habermas 1992a; 1992b; 1998). In this spirit, a number of scholars, many of
whom are German, have advanced reform proposals with the purpose of
democratizing the Union. But they have not done so unopposed, because
constructivist scholarship taking issue with the post-nationalist principles has
started to emerge.
Yet, while suggestive, these critical arguments are rather loosely related.
According to Robert Dahl (1994: 34), much work remains to be done in order to
specify the constraints holding back European identity-formation: “Because of
the problem of tradeoffs in democratic values resulting from changes in scale
has been largely ignored, the opponents of drastic increases in the size of a
democratic unit have little to fall back on except sentiment, attachment,
loyalties.”
2 By organizing such propositions under the heading of bounded
integration, I strive to clarify the contentious issues at stake and to render the
counter-position to post-nationalism more coherent.
My argument proceeds in four stages. First, I introduce two conceptual
dimensions, relating to the logic and scope of identity-formation respectively.
This classification serves as a guide in the second section’s survey of theories of
nationalism, focusing on their approach to integration beyond the nation-state.
The third section applies this theoretical categorization to the problem of the
European Union’s demos as a way to compare the constructivist positions. A
final section outlines the repercussions for future theorizing of the EU’s demos.
DEFINING THE KEY CONCEPTS
Before exploring the literature on nationalism, it is necessary to pin down what
is meant by identification and democracy beyond the nation-state. I start by
considering the analytical logic of identity-formation. Then the second
dimension, representing the territorial scope of political identities, will be
abridged.
The Logic of Identity-formation
Most classifications of scholarly work on nationalism divide the literature into a
modernist and a primordialist camp. Whereas modernists conceive of nations
and nationalism as fundamentally modern phenomena, stemming from theRSC 2000/34 © 2000 Lars-Erik Cederman 5
period after the French Revolution, primordialists contend that they are in some
sense natural and that they date back to time immemorial. Whatever specific
dichotomy is suggested, modernists usually end up on one side of the debate as
the overwhelming majority, leaving very few “primordialist” dissenters on the
other side.
3
As a way to highlight a more relevant fault line, I propose a slightly
modified taxonomy. According to this alternative classification, the main divide
running through the literature corresponds to the relationship between culture
and politics. While some scholars argue that political identities flow more or less
directly from the underlying cultural “raw material,”
4 others contend that the
connection is much more tenuous. I will refer to the first position as essentialism
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Figure 1. The Essentialist Principle of Political Identity-formation.
The essentialist approach is primarily driven by cultural background variables.
According to this logic, each ethnic core produces a political identity in a more
or less direct fashion. In its most elaborated form, essentialist theory allows
cultural and political actors to play a mediating role, though they are restricted to
articulating a given cultural heritage. Here cultural “primitive units” such as
ethnic cores are presumed to exist, and the task of the nationalist entrepreneur is
to “rediscover” and transform it into a politically operational identity (see Figure
1).
Constructivism, by contrast, places more emphasis on politics.
5 In this
view, the unmitigated link between cultural raw material and political identities
is broken by an active process of identity-formation entailing manipulation of
cultural symbols. Since cultural systems are inherently multi-dimensional,
history does not deliver ready-made packages such as ethnic cores. Instead,
intellectuals and political activist select the ethnic cleavages to be mobilized or
suppressed, a process that may also produce new cultural combinations (e.g.
Breuilly 1982; Gellner 1983; Hroch 1985).RSC 2000/34 © 2000 Lars-Erik Cederman 6
Instrumentalist constructivism lets the causal arrows primarily run
“backwards” from right to left (cf. Figure 2). Instead of assuming culture to be
the starting point, instrumental constructivists begin with political identity-
formation emphasizing the autonomy of political factors (typically driven by
external material forces), while treating culture as a mere side-effect of the
process. Maximizing their influence, political leaders mobilize the population in
question by carefully selecting out the cultural cleavages to be activated (Brass













Figure 2. The Constructivist Principle of Political Identity-formation.
Yet other constructivist approaches complement the instrumental logic with an
institutional feedback effect stabilizing the connection between culture and
identity-formation (see the dashed arrow in Figure 2). This interpretation allows
for an “ecological” perspective on identity-formation, which limits the freedom
of choice of political entrepreneurs by blocking or deflecting their initiatives.
Without ruling out rational agency, such an explanation postulates an
institutional “lock-in” effect that traces how identity-formation is affected by the
availability of cultural raw material and ethnic boundaries that acquire an
autonomous role feeding back into the political process.
This process typically has an expressive or rule-following aspect that
defies strictly rationalist explanation. Thus, both a sociological “logic of
appropriateness” and a rational/instrumental “logic of consequences” can be
expected to operate, sometimes reinforcing each other and sometimes in tension
(March and Olsen 1998). To the extent that the former dominates the latter
logic, identities becomes more stable since they are not based on constant cost-
benefit calculations, though neither instrumentally based “stickiness” nor non-
instrumental fickleness should be excluded (Olsen 2000: 6). Rejecting an
exclusively instrumental approach to nationalism, Craig Calhoun thus arguesRSC 2000/34 © 2000 Lars-Erik Cederman 7
that “the development and spread of nationalist discourse is not reducible to
state formation or political manipulation; it has autonomous significance,
appears in cultural arenas not directly defined by state-making projects, and has
often informed popular action to reform or resist patterns of state making”
(Calhoun 1997: 11; cf. Brubaker 1998).
Whatever their precise causal logic, constructivists reject the essentialist
one-way street from cultural to political units. In other words, “we can assume
no simple one-to-one relationship between ethnic units and cultural similarities
and differences. The features that are taken into account are not the sum of
‘objective’ differences, but only those which the actors themselves regard as
significant” (Barth 1969: 14).
The Scope of Identity-formation
The second conceptual dimension asks whether the nation-state will remain the
main locus of identification or whether it will be superseded. Will the old
national identities lose their status as “trump” and cease to dominate other
identities (Calhoun 1993: 229)? I use the term retention of national identity to
denote assumptions that stress the staying power of actually existing nation-
states together with their supporting principle: nationalism, that is, the principle
that requires cultural and political boundaries to coincide (Gellner 1983: 1).
Supersession, by contrast, implies that the nation-state is likely to be
partly or entirely surpassed as the dominant political identity. In other words, the
nation-state is superseded as soon as a supra-national system of symbols is
established and is adhered to by the masses. This can happen in many ways.
Either identification is shifted entirely to the supranational level which takes
over the qualities of the nation-state, or the very principle of nationalism is
transcended. Whereas the former possibility generates a “super nation” (Smith
1990:3), the latter one entails a new form of polity based on non-national
principles (cf. Weiler 1999: 344-348).
6
The conceptual step from national and supranational identity to demos is a
short one, for the latter term refers to the popular unit that exercises democratic
rights, and as such, is usually thought to be constituted by a shared identity.
7
Thus defined, a demos is a group of people the vast majority of which feels
sufficiently attached to each other to be willing to engage in democratic
discourse and binding decision-making (cf. Dahl 1989; Weiler et al. 1995;
Weiler 1999; Abromeit 1998).
Two important remarks should be made at this point. First, democracy is
not necessarily tantamount to majoritarian rule. While, in the most demandingRSC 2000/34 © 2000 Lars-Erik Cederman 8
case, the demos legitimizes majority decisions, it is also possible to imagine
demoi based on super-majorities and more consensual types of decision-making
processes guaranteeing various measures of minority protection (Lijphart 1977).
Second, it should not be assumed that the demos is synonymous with
nationhood. A nation implies the presence of a state, or at least the aspiration of
creating one, and is therefore too limiting a notion of peoplehood (Weber 1946).
This point applies in particular to ethnic nations which impose even more
demanding criteria, dependent as they are on “thick” cultural identities (Walzer
1994). Such a definition of the demos ultimately confounds the second
dimension of political scope with the logic of the first one associated with the
logic of identity-formation (cf. Weiler 1999: 269). At the same time, however, a
demos is more than a mere aggregation of individuals. There has to be a sense of
community, a we-feeling, however “thinly” expressed, for democracy to have
any meaning.
Below I will return to the demos issue. In anticipation of that discussion,
the next section classifies theories of nationalism and integration along the two
dimensions just introduced.
FOUR APPROACHES TO NATIONALISM AND INTEGRATION
How do essentialists and constructivists evaluate the prospects of supranational
political identities? Intuitively, one would expect the former to answer in the
negative and the latter in the affirmative. After all, a directly culture-driven
approach insisting on direct links between ethnic cores and political entities
clashes with the multi-cultural architecture inherent in most supranational
schemes. Constructivists, who place more faith in the autonomy of political
initiatives, appear more ready to imagine experiments superseding the nation-
state. However, these “intuitive” positions by no means exhaust the field of
theoretical possibilities; there are two other possibilities. To highlight them, we
turn to Figure 3, which separates the theoretical perspective on identity-
formation from the general approach to integration.
The “straight-forward” combinations are easily identified as ethno-
nationalism and post-nationalism, the first of these representing essentialists’
assumption of the nation-state as the final equilibrium, and the second term
denoting constructivist integrationism. In addition to those conventional
positions, however, the table opens the door for supranational essentialism as
well as for constructivist explanations of the nation-state. The first of these two
“mixed” cases could be called pan-nationalism since it argues for the existence
of cultural entities greater than the nation-state, such as civilizations, grounded
in culture. I label the opposite possibility bounded integration due to its
emphasis on political and cultural boundaries.RSC 2000/34 © 2000 Lars-Erik Cederman 9
       Viability of identity formation
beyond the nation-state:




Constructivism Bounded integration Post-nationalism
Figure 3. Four Analytical Perspectives on Supranational Identity-formation.
Equipped with this simple four-way taxonomy, it is time to find out what the
nationalism literature has to say about supranational identity-formation. For each
theoretical combination, I will also draw links to the classical theories of
integration that happen to correspond to the position under scrutiny. We start by
exploring the two “obvious” positions, and then move on to the mixed, counter-
intuitive combinations.
Ethno-nationalism
Although some scholars use ethno-nationalism interchangeably with nationalism
(Connor 1994: Chaps. 2 and 4), I will reserve it for essentialist theories
converging on the nation-state. Anthony D. Smith is perhaps the most influential
analyst of the “ethnic revival” (Smith 1981). He is also the essentialist scholar
who has written most extensively about supranational integration.
8 Although
Smith’s “ethno-symbolic” account leaves some room for cultural innovation and
political agency, it does presuppose a rough one-to-one correspondence between
cultural groupings and political identities. Indeed, it makes little sense to speak
of “rediscovery,” “reinterpretation,” and “regeneration” without assuming that
there is something to be rediscovered, reinterpreted and regenerated in the first
place (Smith 1995b). Rejecting cosmopolitanism, Smith suggests that global
culture “strikes no chord among the vast mass of peoples divided into their
habitual communities of class, gender, region, religion and culture.”
9
In fact, according to this culture-driven interpretation, the nation acquires
a life of its own regardless of the state (Smith 1995a: 112). A cultural nation is
assumed to exist before the search for viable political identities can start. Given
Smith’s culture-driven assumptions, it is hardly surprising that he adopts a
skeptical approach to supersession. In his view, the nation-state is unlikely to be
superseded since it is “politically necessary,” “functional to modernity,” andRSC 2000/34 © 2000 Lars-Erik Cederman 10
“historically embedded” (Smith 1995a: Chap. 6). Multicultural constructions
striving to transcend the nation-state, by contrast, lack historical depth and
consequently fail to evoke mass emotions conducive to political loyalty.
According to Smith, the European Union is no exception to this rule. It is
not even clear what a European cultural identity stands for. While
acknowledging that there are shared political traditions such as “Roman law,
political democracy, parliamentary institutions, and Judeo-Christian ethics”, and
cultural ones based on “Renaissance humanism and empiricism, and
romanticism and classicism,” the author suggests that they add up, not to “unity
in diversity,” but to “families of culture” (Smith 1992: 70). Such aggregates are
not to be confused with political or economic unions, which can be constructed
rapidly and rationally. On the contrary, they “tend to come into being over long
time-spans and are the product of particular historical circumstances, often
unanticipated and unintentional” (Smith 1992: 71, see also Smith 1993: 134).
Thus, at best, “a European identity ... would be likely to evolve through a slow,
inchoate, often unplanned process, though selected aspects might be the objects
of attempts at conscious planning” (Smith 1995a: 125). Consistent with his
essentialist outlook, Smith draws the conclusion that political change on the
mass level can only occur incrementally through cultural evolution.
Within the specialized integration literature, “classical”
intergovernmentalism comes close to Smith’s ethno-nationalist position. As
opposed to more recent strands that do not explicitly analyze the cultural
dimension of politics, traditional forms of intergovernmentalist refer explicitly
to “unit-level” characteristics, including culture.
10 Stanley Hoffmann emphasizes
the “logic of diversity” of the state system according to which “the weight of
geography and of history—a history of nations—has kept the nation-states in
their watertight compartments” (Hoffmann 1966: 893, see also Aron 1964). In
the end, what drives the search for the “national interest” is not a sense of
“national consciousness” but an underlying “national situation” for “[a]ny
nation-state ... is ... thrown into the world; its situation is made up altogether of
its internal features—what, in an individual, would be called heredity and
character—and of its position in the world” (Hoffmann 1966: 868).
11
To sum up, ethno-nationalist theories of nationalism assume that political
identities depend directly on their “own” pre-modern cultural communities. In
their view, supranational constructions attempting to transcend national
identities are doomed to fail since they lack the emotional anchoring of the
nation-state. This culturally driven logic is usually postulated rather than
dynamically disentangled. What is missing is a constructivist account of how
various institutionalist mechanisms conspire to reproduce national identities. As
I show below, this is the strength of bounded-integration theories of identity-RSC 2000/34 © 2000 Lars-Erik Cederman 11
formation, but before turning to those, I turn to the polar opposite of ethno-
nationalism.
Post-Nationalism
Whereas essentialist theories of ethno-nationalism arrive at a negative
conclusion regarding the chances of superseding nationalism, many
constructivists conclude precisely the opposite. In opposition to the ethno-
nationalist emphasis on culture as the theoretical starting point, this modernist
program insists on the primacy of politics as a functional response to expanding
material conditions of production. Modern communications created the nation-
state, but since technology continues to develop, political organization will keep
up by increasing its own scale. Eventually this trend will break the politico-
cultural bond of nationalism.
Basing his case on liberal principles of Kantian bent, Jürgen Habermas
classifies nationalism as a “modern phenomenon of cultural integration” created
through historiography and transmitted through “the channels of modern mass
communications” (Habermas 1992: 3). Consistent with this constructivist
outlook, British historian Eric Hobsbawm regards nationalism as a myth and
nations as modern inventions held together by “proto-national” bonds
(Hobsbawm 1990: 46).
Once the artificial nature of nationalism as a political principle has been
recognized, it becomes possible to detach politics from culture, or to put it
differently, “depoliticize the nation” (see Smith 1995a: 11ff). Habermas argues
in favor of a “political culture” serving as a “common denominator for a
constitutional patriotism which simultaneously sharpens an awareness of the
multiplicity and integrity of the different forms of life which coexist in a
multicultural society” (Habermas 1992: 6; see also Ferry 1992a; 1992b). Along
similar lines, Hobsbawm illustrates the historical independence of these two
realms by devising a two-way periodization of European nationalism. While
nationalists of the mid-19th century expressed their cause in civic terms, geo-
cultural contingencies rendered nationalist activity from about 1870 onwards
increasingly ethnic. In an era of large-scale polities such as the superpowers,
however, these reactionary tendencies will fade because of their inherent
inefficiency. Seen in this light, they “are symptoms of sickness rather than
diagnoses, let alone therapy. Nevertheless, they create the illusion of nations and
nationalism as an irresistibly rising force ready for the third millennium”
(Hobsbawm 1990: 177).
Thus political and cultural units are not only conceptually distinct but also
historically contingent. In case of clashes between these two organizationRSC 2000/34 © 2000 Lars-Erik Cederman 12
principles, politics will prevail, leading to a redefinition of culture to serve
political functions. It is important to note, however, that though this rationalist
approach to ethnicity presupposes assimilation, full cultural assimilation is not
required. Post-nationalism, then, does not call for a mere shift to some sort of
“super nation-states.” Rather than being a mere increase of geopolitical scale,
this emancipatory move rests on a qualitative transformation of political
membership (Ferry 1992b: 45).
Among the traditional integration-theoretic perspectives, it is clearly
functionalist theorizing that comes closest to the assumptions of post-
nationalism. In the European context, the most common expression of
functionalism is its refined neofunctionalist form as propounded by Ernst Haas
and others (Haas 1958; 1964; see also Lindberg and Scheingold 1970). An
outspoken and self-conscious constructivist, Haas conceives of this process as a
form of “rationalization.” In his view, ethnonationalism is an unhelpful term that
can be reduced to instrumental principles: “I believe that ethno-nationalists,
being modern and sophisticated people, are easily bought off” (Haas 1993: 525;
see also Haas 1997).
In spite of the important caveats weakening the automaticity of
functionalist theory, neofunctionalists were looking for a “process of increasing
the interaction and the mingling so as to obscure the boundaries between the
system of International Organizations and the environment provided by their
nation-state members” (Haas 1964: 29). To explain this postulated shift, Haas
advanced a set of elaborate and detailed mechanisms, collectively labeled spill-
over and comprising functional, political, and “cultivated” dimensions (see
Tranholm-Mikkelsen 1991).
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Yet, it should be noted that contemporary post-nationalist thinking differs
quite considerably from traditional neofunctionalism which strives to erect a
European federal state as a long-term goal. Far from all post-nationalists are
ready to embrace a statist framework, let alone one that approximates the nation-
state (Shaw 1999). Moreover, as opposed to Haas’ heavy reliance on
instrumental rationality, Habermas’ version of post-nationalism attempts to
transcend this mode of action in favor of the “theory of communicative action”
(cf. Risse 2000). All the same, the overall Enlightenment theme anticipating and
favoring a thrust toward collective learning and larger-scale governance is
shared by both literatures.
In order to go beyond this by now somewhat worn dispute between
intergovernmentalism and neofunctionalism, I use the two-by-two categorization
as a way to find two other theoretical positions. Combining an essentialist
approach to culture with a belief in the nation-state’s supersession, the first ofRSC 2000/34 © 2000 Lars-Erik Cederman 13
these possibilities, pan-nationalism, can be discussed quite briefly since it has
little to say about identity-formation as a process. The bounded-integration
perspective, however, deserves more attention. As will be shown in the next
section, constructivist “Euro-pessimism” offers important insights about
Europe’s demos dilemma.
Pan-nationalism
Even though essentialists are usually associated with nationalism, there is no
logical reason why a culture-driven approach could not at least in theory be
extended beyond the scale of the contemporary nation-states. As a special case
of pan-nationalism, pan-Europeanist doctrines apply the nationality principle
beyond the scale of the contemporary European nation-state (Snyder 1984). To
make politics fit culture, this essentialist line of reasoning assumes Europe to be
a cultural entity waiting to be “rediscovered”: “Although [post-nationalist
scholars] may speak of a new European culture and new Europeans, they see
both as modern versions of something that existed in the past but was destroyed
by the national state and its internecine wars and must now be recovered and
restored” (Smith 1995a: 128-129).
Given the importance of economics in the European integration process, it
does not come as a surprise that these culture-driven views have never been held
by more than a small minority of supranationalists. These scholars find
inspiration in a long tradition of peace plans from earlier centuries. Richard N.
Coudenhove-Kalgeri, who started his lobbying for “Pan-Europa” in the interwar
period, is counted as the father of the modern Pan-Europeanist movement
(Snyder 1984: 4). Denis de Rougemont, perhaps the most prominent exponent of
Pan-Europeanism, also came very close to offering an essentialist defense of
European integration (de Rougemont 1965: 56; cf. Varenne 1993).
Perhaps, Samuel Huntington’s controversial “clash of civilizations” thesis
offers the best-known recent example along these lines, although the main
emphasis is on perpetual conflict rather than transcendence of warfare. Claiming
that future conflict will follow civilizational rifts rather than national borders,
this contentious proposition views civilizations as the “highest cultural grouping
of people and the broadest level of identity people have” (Huntington 1993a: 24;
see also Huntington 1996). Without predicting the demise of the nation-state,
Huntington envisages at least partial supersession of nationalism, a proposition
that is reflected in Huntington’s strictures about European integration: “The
European Community rests on the shared foundations of European culture and
Western Christianity” (Huntington 1993a: 27; see also Obradovic 1996).RSC 2000/34 © 2000 Lars-Erik Cederman 14
As A. D. Smith illustrates, the fundamental difficulties of establishing the
existence of a European cultural essence cast doubt on this position. Besides
repeated attempts by the European Commission and other activists to introduce
policy proposals geared toward promoting cultural Europe’s identity as if it
already existed, few scholars are ready to sign onto a pan-Europeanist agenda.
Bounded Integration
Many constructivist students of nationalism are much less optimistic than their
post-nationalists counterparts about the prospects for erosion of the nation-state.
They emphasize the staying power of nationalism, but for very different reasons
than scholars subscribing to the ethno-nationalist position. Instead of stressing
cultural continuity as the key to nation-formation, they contend that stable
political identities originate in, and are upheld by, explicit policies and
mechanisms. If an institutional equilibrium of this type is reached it usually
proves very stable. Yet, without on-going processes of identity-maintenance,
identities often quickly dissipate. To the extent that the nation-state represents
such an equilibrium, supra-national identity formation becomes unlikely.
This view rests crucially on the assumption that the modern nation
constitutes an abstractly and categorically constituted “imagined community”
(B. Anderson 1991). National communities are seen as Durkheimian social
facts, linking personal identities with those of the state: “In simpler societies,
you become a citizen by occupying a social slot. In modern society, man does
not possess citizenship in virtue of prior membership of some organic sub-part
of it, he possesses citizenship directly” (Gellner 1964: 156). Thus, despite their
imagined nature, these national identities take on an objective character often
quite resistant to change:
Nations may indeed be inventions. But like the wheel, or the internal combustion
engine, they are endowed, once invented, with a real, palpable existence which is not
just to be found in the subjective perceptions of their citizens, but is embodied in laws,
languages, customs, institutions—and history.
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Thus it is evident that many mechanisms contribute to stabilizing and retaining
national identities. Though Gellner has rightly been criticized for his “demand-
side” explanation of nationalism stressing the “needs” of modern industrial
society (Mann 1992; O’Leary 1998), his account does point to specific
institutional mechanisms on the “supply side,” the most important of which is
state-organized education:
At the base of the of the modern social order stands not the executioner but the
professor. Not the guillotine, but the (aptly named) doctorat d’état is the main tool andRSC 2000/34 © 2000 Lars-Erik Cederman 15
symbol of state power. The monopoly of legitimate education is now more important,
more central than the monopoly of legitimate violence (Gellner 1983: 34).
As opposed to pre-modern societies, which socialized their children mainly
within the family, the nation-state is so complex that “production” of citizens
calls for specialized, educational institutions. To be effective as a tool of
political socialization, moreover, formal schooling normally requires a versatile
medium, such as a high language that transcends local dialects. Other important
mechanisms include the printing press (Anderson 1991) and modern media
institutions (Schlesinger 1991). Less obviously identity-conferring projects, such
as road building, legal unification and bureaucratic standardization, create
indispensable symbols and enhance mobility considerably, thus helping to create
the conditions for a national community (Deutsch 1953; E. Weber 1979; Mann
1993). In addition, external processes relating to warfare, immigration and other
flows contribute to the creation and maintenance of the nation-states’ cultural
boundaries (Mann 1992; Colley 1992; Brubaker 1992).
The continued presence of most of these mechanisms together with the
inertia of the cultural representations residing in interaction habits and peoples’
minds make supranational identity formation difficult. Once locked into their
respective “power containers” national identities are unlikely to change
drastically (cf. Giddens 1985). Whereas Ernest Gellner partially supports
projections of cultural convergence as a result of the communication revolution,
he parts company with integrationist predictions along post-nationalist lines, for,
in his view, “it remains difficult to imagine two large, politically viable,
interdependence-worthy cultures cohabiting under a single political roof, and
trusting a single political centre to maintain and service both cultures with
perfect or even adequate impartiality” (Gellner 1983: 119). The reason for
Gellner’s skepticism stems from his belief in a strong, reciprocal link between
politics and culture. The post-nationalist effort to separate the two encounters
difficulties since it fails to realize that “men are dependent on culture, and that
culture requires standardization over quite wide areas, and needs to be
maintained and serviced by centralized agencies” (Ibid., p. 121). The inevitable
conclusion of this reasoning is that “the nationalist imperative of the congruence
of political units and of culture will continue to apply. In that sense, one need
not expect the age of nationalism to come to an end” (Ibid.).
Though not directly addressing European integration, Stein Rokkan’s
(1999) theory of nation-building in Europe leads to similar conclusions. In a
recent essay, Peter Flora (2000) renders this link explicit. Asserting that
Rokkan’s “bundle of processes” that created the nation-state are unlikely to be
repeated at the European level. According to Flora, European integration has
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a common market. This project undermines the historically contingent
connection between identity, political participation, and welfare. Without the
clear boundaries and identity-(re)producing processes of the nation-state, it is
hard to imagine how a viable European identity could ever emerge (on
boundaries see also Bartolini 1998).
In the classical integration literature, constructivist approaches that
emphasize the boundedness of the nation-state have been more rare. Though his
name has often been associated with modernization, Karl Deutsch adopted a
skeptical attitude to supranational identity-formation (Pentland 1973). It is often
thought that Deutsch’s interest in transaction indicators reflected an overly
optimistic view of political identity convergence excluding the possibility of
conflict and setbacks (cf. Breuilly 1982: 20). Yet, while it is true that some of
his students moved closer to post-nationalism (cf. e.g. Puchala 1984), Deutsch
himself remained skeptical of communication as an automatic catalyst of
integration. In fact, the main work Political Community and the North Atlantic
Area explicitly rejects this proposition as a popular but mistaken belief (Deutsch
et al. 1957: 22):
[M]odern life, with rapid transportation, mass communications, and literacy, tends to
be more international than life in past decades and centuries, and hence more
conducive to the growth of international or supranational institutions. Neither the
study of our cases, nor a survey of more limited data from a larger number of
countries, has yielded any clearcut evidence to support this view. Nor do these results
suggest that there has been inherent in modern economic and social development any
unequivocal trend toward more internationalism and world community.
Still there is some doubt about his theory’s constructivist foundations, mainly
because of Deutsch’s fascination with behaviorist methods. In an otherwise
favorable reconstruction of his theory of security communities, Emanuel Adler
and Michael Barnett have recently argued that his book “missed the
constructivist turn” (Adler and Barnett 1998; see also Calhoun 1993: 234).
Instead of discussing the boundaries of national and supranational
communities, it is time to return to the issue of democratic governance within
the European Union. In the next section, therefore, I will elaborate further
bounded integration as an analytical position in the debate about the European
Union’s legitimacy problem. As will become clear, these contributions to the
literature on nationalism help uncover the foundations on which Euro-
pessimistic constructivism rests and put reform proposals on a more solid polity-
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NATIONALISM AND THE EUROPEAN UNION’S DEMOS DILEMMA
Historically, the debate about the constitutional legitimacy of European
integration has proceeded in three stages (Weiler 1996). During the first
decades, the economic performance and legal validity of the EC’s institutions
attracted most scholarly attention. As long as the Community did not intervene
heavily in national affairs, the democratic cycle within the nation-states
remained intact and thus carried most of the weight in terms of legitimating
political life. The Maastricht Treaty (Treaty on European Union, TEU),
however, shifted the focus to the so-called “democratic deficit”. The increased
interest in the democratic component of legitimacy stemmed from both the real
and perceived intrusiveness of the EU in national affairs. Once the “permissive
consensus” eroded, analysts came to treat democracy as the main component of
legitimacy rather than reducing it to material performance (Banschoff and Smith
1999). More recently, and most importantly for the present purpose, the
discussion has reached a third stage that addresses identity formation and the
underlying myths legitimating the entire integration process. Indeed, the
question of the Union’s demos has surged to the top of the debating agenda (see
especially Weiler 1999: 268).
 Since I have defined the demos concept as a collective identity
constituting a people, the link to the theories reviewed in the previous section
should be obvious. Without implying that the two first stages of the debate lack
interest, the rest of this essay concentrates exclusively on the demos debate,
especially as it has unfolded in Germany.
14 I will therefore limit the exposition
to the constructivist approaches to political identity while setting ethno-
nationalism and pan-Europeanism aside. Instead of featuring an exchange
between neofunctionalists and intergovernmentalists, the main theoretical
discussion confronts post-nationalists with students of bounded integration.
But before turning to the constructivist debate, a few words about
essentialist ways of framing the legitimacy problem are in order.
Essentialist Remedies to the Democratic Deficit
By definition, essentialist arguments assume the existence of either a national or
European identity as their starting point. For example, British Euro-skeptics
defend Westminster democratic self-determination against “Brussels”. Likewise,
in an important decision reached in 1993, the German Constitutional Court
examined the democratic legitimacy of the European integration process. After
ten months of deliberation, the Court “acquitted” the Union since it contended
that, in the absence of a demos, the question of democracy could not even be put
in the first place: “On this view, a parliament without a demos is conceptuallyRSC 2000/34 © 2000 Lars-Erik Cederman 18
impossible, practically despotic” (Weiler et al 1995, p. 13). According to Weiler,
this “no demos thesis” fails to recognize the malleability of political identities
and thus exemplifies the ethno-nationalist approach.
15 Because of these
limitations, the efforts to establish democratic legitimacy under ethno-nationalist
conditions have usually turned to consociationalist analogies, with fixed nation-
state identities replacing reified sub-national units. Such a recipe, however,
suffers from elitism and tends to generate status-quo-oriented policies (cf.
Weiler 1999: 279-283).
Taking the opposite position while tacitly postulating the existence of a
European identity, ambitious Euro-federalists analyze the institutional options
very much as if the Union were a federal state. Some of these policies remain
firmly embedded in the first debate about pre-democratic legitimacy. For
instance, the European Commission has promoted various PR measures, such as
the adoption of a Community flag and a national hymn (see de Witte 1987;
Shore 1993). These reforms assume that the main legitimacy problem afflicting
the Union concerns its lacking visibility and the citizens’ insufficient
knowledge. If the EU only were made more palpable in the everyday lives of the
average European, its popularity would automatically increase.
More deep-going proposals emanate from those analysts who insist on
democratic rather than other types of legitimacy. While retaining the
assumptions of a pre-existing, pan-nationalist identity, these diagnoses, that have
been labeled “the Standard Version” (Weiler et al. 1995), analyze the
constitutional preconditions of democracy at the European level. Here the main
emphasis is on establishing parliamentary accountability by strengthening the
European Parliament vis-à-vis other Union institutions (e.g. Williams 1991) or
other institutional solutions based on multi-cameralism or federalism (for an
overview, see Abromeit 1998: Chap. 3).
Returning to the third debate, it is clear that the proposals covered so far
fail to problematize the Union’s demos (Grimm 1995: 292; Closa 1998: 420;
Zürn 1998: 247; Abromeit 1998: 32-35). Only by abandoning these essentialist
perspectives, that have been referred to as the “DemDefLit” by Weiler (1999:
268), it becomes possible to explain what it would take to construct a European
identity that is strong enough to carry the weight of democratic politics. Such an
analysis by no means presupposes that a demos will actually emerge. But if
Europeanized identity-formation is judged unlikely, it is necessary to state why
this is the case.
Using the categorization introduced above, I divide constructivist
theorizing about Europe’s legitimacy problem into two main categories (cf.
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rooted identities, post-nationalists are convinced that the political process itself
will give rise to the necessary identifications. In contrast, analysts more
impressed by the boundedness of the integration process find this position both
utopian and potentially dangerous. As I have already indicated in the
introduction, I shall argue that the bounded-integration criticism of post-
nationalist thinking provides the most convincing line of argumentation.
Post-nationalist Proposals to Solve the Demos Dilemma
In a series of important essays, Jürgen Habermas (1992a; 1992b, 1996, 1998)
has developed a project that is intended to transfer democratic decision-making
from the nation-state to the European Union, and potentially beyond. Above I
have summarized the post-nationalist polity model, so the analysis underpinning
this argumentation should be clear. The underlying assumption, shared by other
analysts in this tradition (Held 1995; Zürn 1998; forthcoming), is one of
increasing globalization, or at least “de-nationalization,” which expands the
scope of economic and social interaction thus rendering the nation-state at least
partly obsolete as a locus of effective and democratic decision-making.
Thus framed, Habermasian post-nationalism attempts to circumvent the
demos dilemma by promoting a “thin” political identity detached from the
nation while at the same time redefining the notion of democracy itself. Rather
than merely emphasizing the electoral dimension, this approach focuses on
deliberative democracy, which can be defined as collective decision making (i)
“with the participation of all who will be affected by the decision or their
representatives” and (ii) “by means of arguments offered by and to participants
who are committed to the values of rationality” (Elster 1998: 8).
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In Habermas’ terminology, communicative action within the framework
of deliberative democracy requires an “ideal speech situation”, or a “community
of communication” in which the best argument wins after the participants have
attempted to convince each other to change preferences (Habermas 1992a).
More precisely, arguments are evaluated based on their factual veracity,
normative appropriateness, and authenticity of the speakers (Müller 1994: 26).
When applied to supranational integration, and to IR more generally, the main
challenge concerns the extent to which such conditions can really be said to
apply in culturally fragmented settings (Müller 1994: 27; Risse 2000).
While the European Union presents less difficulties as a candidate for
democratization than the world as a whole, the problems should not be
underestimated. Unlike pan-Europeanists, post-nationalists are not willing to
merely postulate the existence of a workable community at the European level
(Zürn 1998: 249). In fact, they admit that the Union has quite some way to goRSC 2000/34 © 2000 Lars-Erik Cederman 20
until it can aspire to such an ideal. Insisting that the democracy be detached
from the nation-state, especially in its ethnic form, they place their hopes in
democratic process itself. Thus, the question becomes: Can democracy be
trusted to generate its own sources of community-building? (Schmalz-Bruns
1999: 188).
Answering this question in the affirmative, post-nationalists refer to a
number of mechanisms with “community-creating potential” (Zürn 1998: 254).
These can be organized in three groups in descending order of post-nationalist
emphasis: the associative, electoral, and civic channels:
The associative channel. Due to the post-nationalists’ emphasis on the
non-traditional, deliberative dimensions of democratic governance, the
associative channel plays the most prominent role in their diagnosis. Building on
ideas of transnational politics, Michael Zürn’s (1998; forthcoming) diagnosis
relies heavily on epistemic communities and non-governmental organizations
(NGOs). Recognizing the risk of elitism, his and others’ reform proposals,
which introduce formal admission criteria and status categories for NGOs, are
intended to improve the representativity and transparency of such multi-level
policy-making networks (see also Schmitter 1998). It has even been argued, that
the Union’s system of “comitology” converges on the conditions of deliberative
democracy (Joerges and Neyer 1998; cf. Schmalz-Bruns 1999: 213-218).
The electoral channel. This set of proposals comprises identity-creating
changes of the national and EU voting schemes. Modifications of the existing
institutions, such as the introduction of direct elections to the Council of
Ministers, can be expected not only to enhance political representation in
Europe, but also to involve citizens more closely in the Union’s politics
(Schmitter 1998). Other post-nationalist reforms strive to complement the
European Parliament with Union-wide referenda. If the questions are chosen
carefully, however, it is hoped that such directly-democratic instruments would
have the desired impact on identity-formation (Zürn 1998: 354-355; Schmitter
1998; cf. Abromeit 1998: 148; Weiler 1999: 350-351).
The civic channel. This dimension transgresses the institutional domain
narrowly defined as democratic decision-making. Here the stress is on the civic
infrastructure of democratic governance, in particular the demos as constituted
by the body of citizens. Most post-nationalist proposals have targeted the
membership criteria and rights of European citizenship. Introduced through the
TEU, the current notion of European citizenship is directly dependent on its
national counterpart and offers a rather meager list of rights. If the exercise of
political rights were linked more firmly to residence rather than to national
citizenship, participation and belonging would benefit accordingly (cf. SoysalRSC 2000/34 © 2000 Lars-Erik Cederman 21
1994; Delanty 1995, Chap. 10; Wiener 1997; Schmitter 1998; Closa 1998).
Other aspects of citizenship have gained less prominence, especially the
conditions for political communication and socialization beyond actual
participation in the political process. Though post-nationalist scholars
occasionally comment on these aspects (e.g. Habermas 1998: 154-155), little by
way of positive proposals has materialized in their writings. By contrast, these
issues, which include media, language, and most importantly education,
preoccupy the students of bounded integration to whom we now turn.
Bounded Integration and the Demos Dilemma
The boundedness perspective views modern representative democracy as a
process that co-evolved with nationalism. If the first generation of direct
democracy emerged in the Greek city states, it was within the framework of the
nation-state that democratic rights for the masses finally developed. Thus, the
current issue concerns democracy’s transformation to a third, post-national stage
(Dahl 1989). The stakes are high, because “the danger is that the third
transformation will not lead to an extension of the democratic idea beyond the
nation state but to the victory in that domain of de facto guardianship” (Dahl
1994: 33).
An emphasis on integration’s boundedness implies that the nation-state
represents a stable equilibrium capable of uniting large populations. Such a
community guarantees a communicative capacity that enables deliberation and
generates a sufficiently strong we-feeling that can carry the weight of effective
and democratic governance (March and Olsen 1995). In particular, effective
decision making needs to counter free-riding. By demarcating clear membership
criteria, the nation-state is able to impose duties on and extract resources from
its citizens (Brubaker 1992; Streeck 1995; 1998; Scharpf 1999). The connection
between the nation and democracy, then, should be seen as contingent though
far from arbitrary.
This point is important, for the fact that democracy and the nation “grew
up together” does not mean that the two are indissolubly linked. Indeed,
bounded-integration thinking does not in principle exclude the possibility of
democracy beyond the nation-state; it just postulates more demanding and
precise conditions for its success than do post-nationalists. Thus, it is misleading
to depict bounded views of the nation-state as “primordialist” (Schmalz-Bruns
1997: 71) or to claim that all adherents of a retention perspective fail to realize
the contingency of the link between democracy and the nation-state (Zürn 1998:
250). Clearly, identities can be bounded and “sticky” without being based on
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The advantage of the bounded-integration perspective is that it offers a
more profound and dynamic picture of the entire polity, and thus also of the
democratic process including the production and maintenance of the citizens’
identities. By contrast, the post-nationalist perspective is based on an implicit
notion of a social-contract that highlights the associative and electoral channels
of democracy at the expense of the civic dimension. But in the case of the
European Union, it would be a mistake to take for granted the existence of a pre-
politically defined population that already possesses the basic cognitive capacity
and emotional commitment to participate productively in collective decision-
making.
In keeping with Gellner’s original insight, then, the key to civic
participation lies mainly in education, language policy, and mass media (Lepsius
1991). Even a quick glance at the current situation reveals how far the European
Union is from securing these processes:
Education: Despite several innovative mobility-enhancing reforms, the
education continues to be almost entirely national within the European Union.
The European Commission and other integration enthusiasts have repeatedly
attempted to introduce a “European dimension” into the national curricula, but
all such proposals have fallen upon deaf ears because of fierce national
resistance (de Witte 1987: 137; Theiler 1998). Originally, the Rome Treaty
included a very narrow educational mandate strictly linked to labor mobility.
Thus, the provisions guaranteed vocational training, mutual recognition of
diplomas, and some measures intended to promote scientific research (Field
1998). The first wave of proposals was introduced in the 1970s after it became
clear that instrumental justifications of the European integration process would
not suffice to generate a political identity. In 1972, an expert group issued the
Janne Report, which attempted to broaden the Community capacity in public
education especially in terms of curricular contents. Yet, this and subsequent
attempts to strengthen the “European dimension” in curricula did not enjoy the
member states’ support (Field 1998: 30-31; Theiler 1998). In the 1980s, the
European Commission made further attempts to push the educational agenda.
These bore fruit in the areas of student mobility (Erasmus) and foreign language
teaching (Lingua) but there was no progress in terms of curricular contents. The
trend promoting mobility-enhancing initiatives at the expense of more sensitive,
contents-related reforms continued in the 1990s (Theiler 1998). If anything, the
road to reforms in this area has now been blocked more permanently by
constitutional guarantees included in the TEU and the Amsterdam Treaty
(Koswlowski 1999). But it would be a mistake to put the entire blame on the
governments because survey evidence shows that of all policy areas, education
ranks as the one with the lowest popular support for Europeanization
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Language. Mirroring the bleakness of the educational area, the European
Union also lacks legal instruments to shape the European language regime.
Again the Treaty of Rome provides no direct means to intervene other than
indirect justifications linked to the freedoms of movement (de Witte 1993: 156).
Rather than enhancing linguistic coordination, regulations have been enacted
that protect minority languages, though primarily those recognized by the
member states (Ibid.). While French and English remain the de-facto working
languages of the Union bureaucracy, all eleven of the member states’ languages
still enjoy equal official status. Thus, to the extent that language initiatives have
been suggested, they have usually aimed to safeguard the Union’s linguistic
diversity rather than creating a viable communicative space. Beyond the elite
level, however, the linguistic unification of Europe is often overestimated by
cosmopolitan intellectuals. Even if English makes steady inroads in the language
repertoires of the national populations, thus reducing the coordination problem
(de Swaan 1993), foreign language knowledge remains very modest especially
in Southern Europe (e.g. Grimm 1996: 295).
17 Given the difficulties of living up
to the requirements of mass-based deliberative democracy in a single language,
it would seem that the EU’s multi-language regime needs urgent reform. Despite
some efforts such as the LINGUA program, foreign-language teaching remains
under-funded and fragmented (cf. Coulmas 1991). So far, language policy has
remained a taboo topic within the EU. It may be that multilingual regimes exist,
but none of them equal the Union’s complexity. Thus comparisons with
multilingual democracy in Switzerland seems to be of limited relevance (Grimm
1996).
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Mass media. As in educational and language policy, the Europeanization
process has not got very far in the media sector. Indeed, at the mass level, the
European media establishments remain firmly nationally organized (Gerhards
1993). Viewers overwhelmingly national programming in their own native
tongue (Schlesinger 1999). Moreover, news reporting and general coverage of
Europe have also stubbornly resisted Europeanization (Gerhards 1993). If an all-
European communicative space has emerged at all, this has only been the case
among a privileged minority of European power wielders who read the
Financial Times and watch Euronews (Schlesinger 1999). Relying less on the
printed word for information, the “common” Europeans watch television new
broadcasts in their own language. Yet, the absence of sweeping reforms is not
for lack of trying. A series of attempts were made to create all-European
television channels in the 1980s, such as Eurikon, and Europa TV, but they
failed because their commercial appeal turned out to be very limited
(Schlesinger forthcoming). In addition, the member states have systematically
opposed the European Commission’s efforts to Europeanize the audiovisual
production sector through anti-Americanization campaigns (Theiler
forthcoming).
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to play down the cultural-defense theme in favor of a more technocratic stress
on “multimedia” and other technocratic buzz words. In addition, the
privatization of the sector has made it even harder to imagine a politically
coordinated Europeanization of mass media (Schlesinger forthcoming).
Given the near or total absence of these and other identity mechanisms,
such as party politics and external military threats, it is not surprising that
opinion researchers have registered a reversal of the Europeanization trend in
the 1980s toward a “renationalization” of public opinion (Niedermayer 1995;
Sinnott 1999). Against the backdrop of the increasing intrusiveness and
politicization of the integration process, this trend is precisely what one would
expect from a bounded-integration perspective. If the post-nationalist
perspective were right, the deepening of the integration process affecting more
European citizens should have been reflected in increased loyalty.
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In view of these observations, the post-nationalist project would seem to
resemble wishful thinking rather than an effective action program. Indeed, one
does not have to a pan-nationalist believer in a European nation-state to find it
puzzling how constitutionalization and institutional manipulation could
somewhat make supranational identities “trickle down” to the average European.
In fact, rather than solving the democratic deficit, many of the post-nationalist
reform proposals may even worsen the demos dilemma (Scharpf 1999). Critics
of deliberative democracy have pointed out that, even under the best of
circumstances, such a notion of legitimacy is likely to favor those who excel in
communication at the expense of those who do not dispose of such resources
(e.g. Schlesinger 1999). At least it seems necessary to ask: “Does the unequal
distribution of education, information, and commitment pose a threat to
deliberative democracy?” (Elster 1998: 16).
In particular, the post-nationalists emphasis on the associative channel
renders their proposals particularly vulnerable to such critique, for “expert”
networks of EU insiders involve a wafer thin minority of Europeans without any
safeguards of equal representation (one-person-one-vote) or electoral
accountability (if necessary, throw out the “rascals”). Instead of the “best”
argument prevailing as in Habermas’ “ideal speech situation” (to the extent that
it even exists in a given case), the most powerfully backed interests will be the
likely winner, especially in redistributive issues. The tendency toward
“representational monopolies” is particularly worrying (Weiler 1999: 284).
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Furthermore, deliberation in policy networks without the “shadow” of binding
majority decisions and state-led regulation is hardly likely to be either
democratic or effective (Abromeit 1998: 90-91).
22 In this connection, Joseph
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It is time to worry about infranationalism—a complex network of middle-level
national administrators, Community administrators and an array of private bodies with
unequal and unfair access to a process with huge and economic consequences to
everyday life—in matters of public safety, health, and all other dimensions of socio-
economic regulation. Transparency and access to documents are often invoked as a
possible remedy to this issue. But if you do not know what is going on, which
documents will you ask to see? (Weiler 1999: 349).
It seems hard to deny, then, that the Habermasian project has more to do with
utopian, liberal theory along the lines of David Mitrany’s (1975) technocratic
functionalism than with pragmatic and politically grounded neofunctionalism.
Even though Haas’ (1958; 1964) theory falls short of providing an accurate
approach to mass-based legitimacy, at least his version of functionalism
incorporates a power logic and specific political mechanisms. In this very sense,
contemporary post-nationalist theorizing represents a regressive step back to
utopian functionalism. In its diluted, highly normative, post-national form,
deliberate democracy risks degenerating into deliberation without democracy.
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Similar problems afflict the post-nationalists’ suggestions for an improved
electoral channel of democratic legitimacy. The fact remains that elections,
whether direct or representative, require a minimal agreement of the electorate
to be bound by majority decisions (even if qualified):
Given the historical, linguistic, cultural, ethnic, and institutional diversity of its
member states, there is not question that the Union is very far from having achieved
the ‘thick’ collective identity that we have come to take for granted in national
democracies—and in its absence, institutional reforms will not greatly increase the
input-oriented legitimacy of decisions taken by majority rule (Scharpf 1999: 9).
Although Scharpf may be asking for too much in this quote, his observation
does highlight a chicken-and-egg dilemma confronting optimistic post-
nationalists who believe that Europe-wide referenda could create a demos. The
crux is the same that haunts radical federalist plans: how to justify voting until
there is agreement on being bound by collective decisions? The Maastricht
ratification debacle illustrates that much less drastic plans could provoke
considerable resistance with potentially disastrous consequences for the
integration process. It is hard to see how the Union’s legitimacy problem could
be solved through yet more elections without prior, or at least simultaneous,
deployment of alternative means of identity formation. In other words, European
decisions “are legitimate only because they do in fact respect the limitations of
their legitimacy base” (Scharpf 1999: 23).
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Despite the ingenuity of the post-nationalist proposals, I conclude that
there is no way around the civic channel. Granted the existence of demos-
dependent legitimacy constraints that limit the level of institutional integration,RSC 2000/34 © 2000 Lars-Erik Cederman 26
there are only two options.
25 Bounded integrationists therefore suggest
autonomy-protective schemes and direct identity-promoting plans:
Autonomy protection simply means that the integration process must be
slowed down in order for identity-formation to catch up. In the most drastic
case, “roll back” or “re-nationalization” of particular issue might be necessary.
At least, it is recommended not to Europeanize any issue area that is so
controversial that it would worsen the legitimacy problem. As opposed to
neofunctionalist spillover, this version of bounded integration emphasizes the
desirability of both territorial, but also of functional, boundaries. Hence, in order
to protect democratic decision-making, integration should be limited to those
issues where national policies are truly ineffective (see Scharpf 1996; 1999;
Gustavsson 1997).
There is much to said for this pragmatic way to ameliorate the demos
dilemma, at least in the short run. Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether it really
presents a solution for the long-term evolution of the Union. First, given the
built-in momentum in the European integration process, authority transfers to
the EU may turn out to be unstoppable (Zürn 1998: 252; Flora 2000). Second,
even if the process could be halted, autonomy protection may still be insufficient
since a lot of power has already been transferred to Brussels. After all, roll back
is probably unrealistic in view of the institutional inertia of the EU. Third, if
confronted with an external, security-related crisis, the Union might need to
strengthen its internal cohesion. While the crisis itself could contribute to this
effect, it would be irresponsible to wait until the crisis hits.
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For all these reasons, it seems hard to avoid advocating direct identity-
promotion if only in the more distant future. Of course, a introduction of such
radical measures would tax the Union’s legitimacy base as much as, and
potentially even more than, radical post-nationalist constitutionalization.
Nevertheless, if designed so as to guarantee the nation identities’ continued
survival, such mechanisms could broaden the European communicative space.
Given the almost complete absence of civic education on European themes,
there would seem to be plenty of room for Europeanization of parts of the
curricula without threatening the dignity of the nation-states. By the same token,
a radical improvement of foreign language teaching could be combined with a
strengthened system supporting minority languages. Once “Europeanized”
citizens with a broader cultural horizon and better language skills start to enter
the media “market place,” the conditions for all-European mass media might
finally materialize. Provided that the “supply” of European identity is secured,
the civic “demand side” could be attended to, for example through some of the
post-nationalist proposals mentioned above. As long as the political will lacks toRSC 2000/34 © 2000 Lars-Erik Cederman 27
build a democratic infrastructure, however, democratization in the narrow,
institutional sense will probably cause more trouble than it solves.
CONCLUSION: FROM A EUROPEAN POLICY TO A EUROPEAN
POLITY
By applying theoretical ideas from the literature on nationalism, this paper has
highlighted a lacuna in contemporary integration theory. While the scientific
attention has come to include identity-related issues, there is still a bias in favor
of integrationist attitudes in the constructivist literature. In order to create a
counter-weight to this tendency, I have sketched the contours of an opposing
research program centered on the notion of bounded identities.
The boundary focus brings to the fore an aspect of identity-formation
seldom touched upon in the constructivist IR literature. While identities play a
central role in that literature, they are usually understood as role descriptions
rather than comprehensive polity definitions (cf. Wendt 1994). Thus, much of
today’s constructivist research concerns how national identities and policy-
making are affected by the Europeanization process without questioning the
very boundaries between the nation-state and the European level. Though
undoubtedly valuable as an account of how role definitions evolve and affect
policies, social-constructivist theories of integration have less bite on processes
triggering the emergence of national and supranational communities (Cederman
and Daase 1999).
As already indicated, the question of a European demos falls into this
category. One does not have to believe that a European people already exists, or
could easily emerge, to find a bounded-integration perspective useful. Rather
than stipulating Euro-pessimistic predictions as a matter of assumption,
retentionist theorists need to explain why a corporate identity is indeed unlikely
to form on the supranational level. Such an explanation requires a boundary-
endogenizing perspective uncovering the mechanisms maintaining and
reproducing national identities. Likewise, to the extent that a transformation is
thought to be possible, theorists must provide an explicit theory outlining the
causal mechanisms changing the relevant identities.
Fortunately, there are contemporary strands of constructivism that do
precisely this. John Meyer and his colleagues at Stanford University have
developed a version of sociological institutionalism that explicitly traces the
creation of citizens. One of the main dimensions of their research program has
been the development of mass schooling. According to this perspective, which
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socializing individuals to a civic culture but also a public: “Mass education
expands the number of persons seen as possessing human and citizenship
responsibilities, capacities, and rights” (Meyer 1977: 70). Further emphasizing
the macro perspective, Meyer, Ramirez, and Soysal (1992: 131) conclude that
“mass education became a core component of the nation-state model.”
In addition to these sweeping comparisons, the Meyer group has produced
more detailed, historical studies that trace the dynamic unfolding of mass
schooling. For example, John Boli (1989) provides a detailed account of how
education took on a central importance in the Swedish quest to build a new,
egalitarian society in the 19
th century. Instead of being limited to the role of as
welfare-promoting institution for training and knowledge transfer, public
schools became the prime instrument for the realization of modern citizenship,
and by extension participatory democracy. While Boli records an eroding
influence of a “refeudalizing” trend defining the role of education in more
narrowly economic terms, he optimistically speculates that Europe would could
become fertile soil for the emergence of world citizenship in the 21th century.
Whether one agrees with Boli’s post-nationalist projections or not, his and
his colleagues’ work shows that there is a rich sociological-institutionalist
literature on demos-formation although it has not yet been applied
systematically to European integration. Although this particular school has been
criticized for paying insufficient attention to causal mechanisms (Hall and
Taylor 1996; though see Meyer et al. 1997), it provides sharper analytical tools
and more sophisticated methodologies than the interdisciplinary literature on
nationalism.
In combination, both these intellectual currents could make up the basis
for future research conceptualizing and evaluating the bounds of European
integration. Without extrapolating from historical cases, such a program would
analyze the way that today’s national identities emerged, how they are being
reproduced, and what it would take to complement them with a new, mass-based
layer of political identification ultimately constituting a viable European demos.
It is hard to see how we could resist this invitation.
Lars-Erik Cederman
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ENDNOTES:
* On leave from Department of Politics; University of California at Los Angeles; Box 951472;
Los Angeles, CA 90095-1472. I am indebted to Ronald Jepperson, Thomas Risse and the
other members of the European Forum as well as Simon Hug and Tobias Theiler for
stimulating comments. However, the responsibility for mistakes and errors remains my own.
This paper contains material drawn from my introductory chapter in Cederman (forthcoming).
1 Other analysts have also come to the conclusion that “polity-building” is an understudied
theme in the integration literature (see e.g. Laffan 1998; Weiler 1999; Christiansen et al.
1999: 538; Olsen 2000).
2 For a similar attempt to evaluate debating positions based on an underlying polity-
categorizing framework, see Weiler (1999, Chap. 8).
3For classifications of this type, see e.g. Anthony D. Smith (1986; 1995a; 1995b). There is a
disturbing tendency in the political science literature to dismiss sophisticated work as
“primordialist” (e.g. A. D. Smith and Walker Connor) just because it highlights the inertia of
cultural constructs (Calhoun 1997). Yet, a quick glance at their work shows that this is unfair
(cf. Smith 1986, pp. 12-13; Connor 1994, pp. 103-106).
4Etzioni (1965) uses the term “identitive assets”.
5Note that constructivism in the nationalism literature entails endogenization of nations as
whole actors. Most of the constructivist literature in IR endogenizes states’ “social identities,”
while exogenizing states’ corporate identities and completely bracketing national identities
(Wendt 1994; 1999). Moreover, essentialist theories can be said to contain an element of
construction to the extent that they show how cultural élites uncover the cultural essence of
the nation. Yet, as we have seen, such perspectives have little to say about the institutional
basis of identity-formation, which is the focus of constructivist theories.
6Another important issue concerns the status of sub-national identities, but that topic will be
explored in this paper. See, e.g., Smith (1995a: Ch. 4); Connor (1994: Ch. 7); Streeck (1998).
7 It is also possible to imagine other types of democracy that do not depend on the existence
of a people (Münch 2000). Cf. Schumpeter’s elitist model of democracy comes to mind (cf.
Dahl 1956; Closa 1997: 420). However, today, the vast majority of democratic theorists tend
to agree tacitly or explicitly that democratic governance requires a demos.
8Another authority on this topic, Walker Connor, has done much to dispel the assimilationist
illusions propagated by modernization theorists. While emphasizing the “emotional” and
“ethnic” aspects of nationalism, Connor distances himself from the essentialist standpoint
more clearly than does Smith. See Connor (1994: 75, 104-105). Still, Connor (1994: 134),
agrees with Smith’s skeptical attitude toward a pan-European identity.
9Smith (1995a: 24). Elsewhere, Smith weakens the link between ethnie and nation by
remarking that “however and whenever ethnogenesis took place, it forms the essential
building block of later national identities—even if that identity comes to include other ethnies
or ethnic fragments than the core itself.” It is clear, however, that those modifications do not
detract from the existence of a pre-modern cultural core driving the entire process, thus the
references to “other ethnies” and “the core itself.” Smith 1993: 130; 1992.
10 Due to its heavy reliance on rationalistic theory, liberal intergovernmentalism has little to
say about identities but tacitly assumes the existence of nation-states (cf. Moravcsik 1998).
11 Other variants on intergovernmentalism include an historical school led by Milward (1992)
and Taylor’s (1991) “modified intergovernmentalist” paradigm based on consociationalist
principles.
12Nevertheless, the integration setbacks in the 1960s and 1970s triggered a theoretical
reorientation tempering the hopes of a massive transfer of loyalty (Haas 1976). While
continuing to stick to a predominantly instrumentalist line in his more recent scholarship, hasRSC 2000/34 © 2000 Lars-Erik Cederman 39
qualified his earlier “Euro-optimistic” attitudes by endorsing a more guarded “Euro-
agnosticism” (Haas 1993; 1997).
13D. Cannadine as quoted in Miller (1995: 164). This view is compatible with the
epistemological postulate of a third realm beyond the two “conventional” worlds populated by
objective, natural phenomena and subjective, psychological minds (Adler 1997). In this view,
nations are social facts, as opposed to natural ones.
14 For other important dimensions of democracy, see Zürn (1998) and Scharpf (1999).
15 Note, however, that the “not-yet demos thesis” is constructivist and coincides with the
bounded integration perspective (cf. Weiler 1996: 10). For example, Kielmansegg (1996)
defends national democracy since he argues that the necessary conditions are lacking at the
European level and an identity would take a very long time to develop.
16 See Cohen and Rogers (1995) and Schmalz-Bruns (1997) on the related notion “associative
democracy.” For an overview and critique, see Abromeit (1998: 87-90)
17 According to the European Commissions’s (2000) optimistically phrased web site, “half of
Europe is already multilingual.” Closer scrutiny shows that there are several countries in
which the proportion of speakers of any foreign language is below a third, in most cases by a
wide margin (e.g. Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Italy, the UK). In addition, these figures
should probably be taken with a grain of salt since they reflect self-reported, “conversational”
skills that may fall short of what would be required by “deliberative democracy.”
18 In addition, it can be doubted if Switzerland really lives up to the liberal ideals of
deliberative democracy (Sciarini, Hug, and Dupont forthcoming). Laitin (1997) even refers to
India as a model for Europe, but its exemplary value can be doubted, at least within the
respect to deliberative democracy.
19 Arguably, American media, such as CNN, have contributed more to forming unified media-
consumption habits in Europe, though the programming material is hardly adapted to
European circumstances.
20 Banschoff and Smith (1999: 7-9) attempt to play down the significance of the survey
results, but their arguments fail to convince. To say that the loyalty gap depends on the
increased intrusiveness of the integration process does not make the problem less serious—on
the contrary it accentuates the need for identity mechanisms. They also suggest that the
dissatisfaction might be linked to particular issues. But this point is spurious because if the
overall support for the EU depends on single issues, its identity cannot be very secure in any
case. Finally, they remark that the surveys only offer mere snapshots of a dynamic process. Of
course, there could be a delay until participatory habits spread to the masses but it is worrying
that there still is no sign of improvement. If there is a trend, it is pointing in the opposite
direction.
21 Schmalz-Bruns (1999: 215-216) tries to circumvent this fundamental objection by invoking
“epistemic proceduralism” but in my view the dilemma remains. One of the main stumbling
blocks is that the “right solution” depends on the discursive framing of a particular issue (cf.
Cederman 2000).
22 This does not mean that post-nationalists pay no attention to the electoral channel. One has
to agree with Weiler (1999: 284) that it is especially hard to realize who will supervise and
regulate the system of non-governmental organizations, as suggested by post-nationalist
scholars (e.g. Zürn 1998; Schmitter 1998). Yet, all these problems do not negate the
usefulness of “informal patterns of interaction preceding or accompanying formal decisions
taken by parliaments under the majority rule, or by negotiated agreement among
governments, or in other formally legitimized modes of interaction” (Scharpf 1999: 20).RSC 2000/34 © 2000 Lars-Erik Cederman 40
23 Given the prevalence of learning theory in Haas’ (1990) and other liberal scholars’ work, it
is also unclear to what extent the “theory of communicative action”, as applied to European
integration or IR more generally, represents a truly new development.
24 Furthermore, without (or until there is) a fully legitimate European Parliament, it remains
obscure who will select the suitably identity-promoting questions that Zürn (1998) advocates.
To expect the member states to be willing to hand over the power to call and design referenda
to the European Commission appears doubtful both from a factual and normative standpoint.
25 See Deutsch (1953) for an early hypothesis stating that centrifugal conflict is likely when
mobilization outpaces assimilation.
26 From a macro-historical perspective, loose confederations have tended to be unstable (Riker
1964). In other contexts, “ethno-federalism” has paved the way for spectacular state collapses,
as evidenced by the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia (Bunce 1999). Other critiques appear less
convincing, such as Zürn’s (1998: 252-253) assertion that autonomy protection necessarily
entails secrecy or that autonomy protective schemes are particularly irreversible.